A Quantitative Theory of Tax Evasion and Informality

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Abstract

I study how heterogeneous establishments optimally select themselves into informality, tax compliance, and formal tax evasion, through the lens of a general equilibrium model. I calibrate the model to match key moments of the employment size distribution in Mexico, as well as some aggregate moments. In equilibrium, tax revenues rely on medium-sized firms, which are scarce. Eliminating informality (formal tax evasion) increases tax collection by 80 (68) percent. As the economy develops, the informal sector shrinks, while the tax-evading sector expands, thus limiting potential collection. If lower informality is a byproduct of development, and not vice versa, a solid tax base can be achieved by fiscal authorities effectively via enforcement on formal, tax-evading firms.

Keywords: Tax evasion, formal sector, informality, enforcement, rent seeking, firm heterogeneity.

JEL Classification Codes: H26, H32, K42, L26, O17, O43, O47.

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1 Introduction

Informality as well as tax evasion by formal firms are pervasive in developing countries. Many firms choose to remain small and avoid taxes and regulations altogether, whereas others are able to reduce their tax burden through lawyers, accountants, and bribes or other forms of corruption. While there are numerous studies that model informality and its aggregate effects, the rent-seeking activities undertaken by many formal firms are largely ignored in traditional theories of production. I show how firms optimally select themselves into informality, tax compliance, and formal tax evasion, according to their productivity and the institutional environment.

Tax evasion and tax avoidance have always existed: from wealthy Romans in the third century burying their jewelry to avoid the luxury tax, to eighteen-century English homeowners who bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice from the hearth tax collector (Slemrod, 2007, on Webber and Wildavsky, 1986), to Apple’s multi-billion dollar accounts in offshore tax havens.1 Even in the modern-day U.S., Slemrod (2007) cites an IRS estimate of 17 percent for the noncompliance rate of the corporate income tax in 2001. The World Bank Enterprise Survey estimates that 54% of companies across 135 developing countries do not report all income tax to authorities, while Artavanis, et.al. (2015) report a not-so-small figure of 36% for Europe.

Evidently, these tax-evading activities are not costless—the wealthy Romans and the English homeowners spent some of their valuable time digging and laying bricks, while Apple undoubtedly hires many skilled accountants and lawyers to devise and execute their tax-minimizing strategies. Also implied in these anecdotes is the notion that higher stakes usually command higher efforts, as hiding personal jewelry certainly requires less resources than avoiding a multi-billion dollar tax bill. The idea that larger, more productive firms find it more attractive to engage in “defensive” rent seeking is also recognized by Tullock (1992).

This paper makes four contributions. First, I show how agents optimally choose the tax-evading efforts just described as a function of their productivity, market prices, and the institutional environment. Specifically, I consider an environment where formal firms can reduce their fiscal burden by spending resources—either legally or illegally. This formulation is not particular to developing countries, and can be thought of as a quantitative framework to think about the ideas first posed by Krueger (1974). The degree of rent seeking observed in the model economy depends on the stringency of the tax system, as well as on the level of enforcement and statutory provisions that allow firms to reduce their fiscal outlay, i.e. the returns to firms’ tax-evading efforts. The theory predicts that larger, more productive firms

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spend more resources in tax-avoiding/evading activities, and thus face a lower tax burden.

Second, I apply the theory to the specific case of business income taxes, and show how the mixture of formal tax-evading, formal tax-compliant, and informal firms is determined in equilibrium. To this end, I develop a model where individuals with idiosyncratic managerial abilities face the choice of becoming formal entrepreneurs, informal entrepreneurs, or workers. Informal entrepreneurs avoid paying taxes by staying small, while formal entrepreneurs have the choice of complying with the tax code, or spending resources to reduce their fiscal outlay. The coexistence of small informal firms that do not pay taxes and large formal tax-evading firms results in an effective tax schedule that relies on medium-sized firms. This result links the evidence on the “missing middle” of the distribution of firm sizes in developing countries to a low capacity of the state to generate tax revenues—which is another common feature of many developing countries.

Third, I calibrate the model to the Mexican economy—where informal firms employ 34 percent of workers, and tax evasion by formal firms is estimated at 37 percent of tax collection. The model does well at replicating some non-targeted moments of the data, including some limited evidence on firm-level effective income tax rates. I then consider the effects of three counterfactual policy experiments: 1) improved partial enforcement, 2) full enforcement, and 3) changes in the statutory tax rate. I find that eliminating informality (tax evasion by formal firms) increases tax revenues as a percentage of GDP by 80 (68) percent. TFP, investment and output respond positively to partial and full reductions in informality, but remain unaffected by enforcement on formal firms. I find that both partial and complete reductions in informality increase the amount of rent seeking in the economy. Last, the Laffer curve generated by the model suggests that Mexico’s recent income tax rates have been near the revenue-maximizing value, and thus the state’s capacity to raise revenues is unlikely to improve via further changes to these rates.

Finally, I explore the effects of economic development on the equilibrium mixture of firms, tax revenues, as well as the amount of tax evasion in the economy. As the economy grows, for given taxes and enforcement parameters, the informal sector shrinks, and eventually disappears. The share of formal, tax evading firms, however, continues to grow with the economy, limiting the state’s capacity to raise tax revenues even as the economy prospers. The last result provides a rationale for the existence of developed countries with high levels of tax evasion and/or avoidance, and helps explain the rise of occupations such as accounting and law as economies develop. The findings suggests that, to the extent that lower informality is a byproduct of development, and not vice versa, a solid tax base can be achieved by fiscal authorities more effectively via enforcement on formal, tax-evading firms.

Clearly, there are other aspects of formal tax evasion and tax avoidance that deserve
attention. The feature of tax evasion often highlighted in the literature is the probability of being caught by the tax authorities, which usually comes with a punishment, as in the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this paper, I focus on a largely unexplored dimension of firm-level tax evasion and tax avoidance, namely, that they are costly activities optimally chosen by firms, much like any other productive input, and that they reflect both loop holes in the tax code, as well as the state’s capacity to enforce it. My treatment of tax avoidance and tax evasion is similar to Mayshar (1991), and Slemrod (2001), who study the partial equilibrium decision of a utility-maximizing individual taxpayer with access to a “tax technology” that allows him to exert labor effort to reduce his tax burden. Acemoglu (2005) and Piketty, et.al. (2014) also consider economies where tax sheltering is costly, although their focus is on a different set of issues.

My treatment of informality borrows heavily from Leal-Ordóñez (2014), who studies the aggregate effects of informality due to incomplete tax enforcement at the extensive margin. Additionally, I analyze the effects of incomplete tax enforcement at the intensive margin, in the same spirit as Ulyssea (2015), who considers an economy where firms can be informal either by not registering their business, or by hiring workers “off the books.”. Even though I consider ways in which firms avoid taxes different than outsourcing of employees, to the extent that outsourcing is a costly activity that brings the firm some tax benefits, Ulyssea’s core idea is implicit in my formulation.

2 A model economy

2.1 Entrepreneurial choice, tax evasion and informality

There is a representative household populated by a unit continuum of members. Entrepreneurial ability is distributed over the household members according to some distribution \( F(Z) \), with bounded support \([Z_L, Z_H]\), and pdf \( f(Z) \); with \( Z_L \geq 0 \). Agents can choose to become formal entrepreneurs, informal entrepreneurs, or workers. Formal entrepreneurs have, in turn, the choice of being fully compliant with the tax code, or to engage in costly rent-seeking activities to reduce their tax burden.

If agents choose to become entrepreneurs—irrespective of the type—they can operate a diminishing-returns to scale technology that utilizes capital and labor as inputs to produce a homogeneous good, as in Lucas (1978). Output by an entrepreneur of ability \( Z \) is given by

\[
Y = Z^{1-\theta} \left( K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha} \right)^\theta,
\]
where \( K \) and \( N \) are the amount of capital and the number of workers hired by the firm, \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) is the share of capital and \( \theta \in (0, 1) \) measures the span of control. If the agent chooses to become a worker, he earns a wage \( w \).

Firms face a statutory tax on profits \( \tau_0 \). Formal firms can choose to comply with the statutory tax, or to pay bribes or hire expediters to reduce their tax liability. I call these rent-seeking expenditures \( B \). In the derivations below, I assume the tax-evasion technology faced by a formal firm takes the following functional form:

\[
\tau = \tau_0 \exp(-\phi B),
\]

where \( \tau \) is the effective tax rate, and \( \phi \geq 0 \) measures the returns to the formal entrepreneur’s rent-seeking efforts. The parameter \( \phi \) represents both the level of enforcement on formal firms, as well as the statutory provisions in the tax code which allow firms to reduce their fiscal burden. Exploiting these provisions, in turn, usually requires hiring an expeditor. In general, the pair \((\tau_0, \phi)\) can vary across countries, across sectors, or even across firms. In what follows I assume \( \tau_0 \) and \( \phi \) are the same for all firms.

If the entrepreneur chooses to evade taxes, his problem is then to choose \((K_E, N_E, B)\), given \( Z, \tau_0, \phi \) and factor prices \((w, r)\), to maximize profits,

\[
\Pi_E(Z) \equiv \max_{K_E, N_E, B} \left( 1 - \tau_0 e^{-\phi B} \right) \left[ Z^{1-\theta} (K_E^{\alpha} N_E^{1-\alpha})^\theta - rK_E - wN_E \right] - B,
\]

subject to \( B \geq 0 \).

The optimal choices by the entrepreneur are

\[
K_E(Z) = Z \left[ \frac{\alpha \theta}{r} \kappa^{\theta(1-\alpha)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}.
\]

\[
N_E(Z) = Z \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha)\theta}{w} \kappa^{\theta\alpha} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}},
\]

\[
B(Z, \phi) = \frac{1}{\phi} \ln \left( \tau_0 \phi \left[ Z^{1-\theta} (K_E^{\alpha} N_E^{1-\alpha})^\theta - rK_E - wN_E \right] \right),
\]

Where

\[
\kappa \equiv \frac{K_E}{N_E} = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \frac{w}{r}
\]

is the capital-labor ratio common to all formal firms. Notice that the input choices are independent of the choice of rent-seeking expenditures and the effective tax rate. Therefore,
neither the statutory tax, or the possibility of reducing it distort the optimal choices of capital and labor. In this economy, larger, more productive firms spend more in rent seeking and thus have a lower tax burden.

In general, tax evasion is a gamble not explicitly considered in this formulation. However, the risky aspect of tax evasion can be presented in this framework if, as explained by Mayshar (1991), one defines $B$ as the payment which generates the same expected profit loss as the extra risk an evading firm takes on, for given expected tax payments. In what follows I use the terms “evasion” and “avoidance” interchangeably.

Let $\Psi(w, r)$ be defined as

$$\Psi(w, r) = (1 - \theta) \left( \frac{\theta \alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{\alpha \theta}{r}} \left( \frac{\theta (1 - \alpha)}{w} \right)^{\frac{(1 - \alpha) \theta}{1 - \theta}}$$

(5)

The profits of the tax-evading entrepreneur are then given by

$$\Pi_E(Z) = Z \Psi(w, r) - \frac{1}{\phi} \left[ 1 + \log (\tau_0 \phi Z \Psi(w, r)) \right].$$

(6)

Entrepreneurs who chose to comply with the tax code solve the following problem

$$\Pi_C(Z) \equiv \max_{K_C, N_C} (1 - \tau_0) \left[ Z^{1 - \theta} \left( K_C^{\alpha} N_C^{1 - \alpha} \right)^{\theta} - r K_C - w N_C \right],$$

Their input choices are

$$K_C(Z) = Z \left[ \frac{\alpha \theta}{r} K^{\theta(1 - \alpha)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \theta}},$$

(7)

$$N_C(Z) = Z \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) \theta}{w} K^{\theta \alpha} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \theta}},$$

(8)

with profits

$$\Pi_C(Z) = (1 - \tau_0) Z \Psi(w, r).$$

(9)

I model informality as in Leal-Ordóñez (2014). Informal entrepreneurs do not pay any taxes. They are able to do so by staying small. I assume that the government has the ability to detect any firm with a capital stock greater than some $D > 0$. In the case of detection, the firm is shut down and the entrepreneur earns zero profits. Therefore, the greater $D$, the lower the ability of the government to detect informal firms. This threshold strategy is consistent with optimal tax enforcement by a government with low resources that is able to
observe input choices by firms, which are in turn signals of the entrepreneur’s productivity, as shown by Bigio and Zilberman (2010).

Thus, we can write the problem solved by informal entrepreneurs as follows,

\[
\Pi_I(Z) \equiv \max_{K_I, N_I} \left(1 - \theta \right) \left(K_I^{\alpha} N_I^{1-\alpha}\right)^\theta - rK_I - wN_I,
\]

subject to

\[K_I \leq D.\]

Let \(\mu(Z)\) denote the multiplier on the size constraint—the shadow cost of informality. Highly productive entrepreneurs will face a higher \(\mu(Z)\), while unproductive entrepreneurs may not be bound by the size constraint at all, thus facing a multiplier equal to zero. As long as there is a positive measure of informal entrepreneurs for which \(\mu(Z) > 0\), there will be aggregate productivity losses from informality.

The input choices of informal firms are

\[
K_I(Z) = Z \left[ \frac{\alpha \theta}{r + \mu(Z)} \tilde{\kappa}(Z)^{\theta(1-\alpha)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \tag{10}
\]

\[
N_I(Z) = Z \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)\theta}{w} \tilde{\kappa}(Z)^{\theta\alpha} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \tag{11}
\]

where

\[
\tilde{\kappa}(Z) = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right) \frac{w}{r + \mu(Z)}
\]

is the capital-labor ratio, which varies across informal firms. Firms that face a higher shadow cost of informality have a lower capital-labor ratio.

The profits of informal firms are then,

\[
\Pi_I(Z) = \omega(Z) Z \Psi(w, r). \tag{12}
\]

where \(\omega(Z) = \left( \frac{r}{r + \mu(Z)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{1-\theta}}\) is the profit wedge caused by firms’ choice of staying small to avoid paying taxes, resulting in a fraction \(1 - \omega(Z)\) of profits being lost—an implicit informality tax. Figure 1 shows \(\omega(Z)\). As \(Z\) increases, it becomes less and less profitable to operate as an informal firm.

With this notion in hand, notice that an entrepreneur’s pre-tax (and pre-tax-evasion expenditures when applicable) profits are given by \(Z \Psi(w, r)\), regardless of firm type. The
differences in net profits across firm types, then, arise from differences in the cost of doing business: informal firms pay an implicit informality tax, formal compliant firms pay the statutory tax, while formal tax-evading firms pay a combination of taxes and tax-evasion expenditures.

Lemma 1 There exists a unique value $Z_E$, such that if $Z > Z_E$, formal firms choose to evade taxes. This value is given by $Z_E = \left[ \phi \tau_0 \Psi(w, r) \right]^{-1}$.

All proofs are in the appendix. The equilibrium cutoff $Z_E$ is decreasing in $\phi$ and $\tau_0$, since as both increase it becomes more profitable to spend resources to evade taxes, so more firms engage in formal tax evasion. It is increasing in $w$ and $r$, a property helpful to explain general equilibrium effects in the next sections.

In the same spirit as the choice of tax evasion by formal firms, the choice of informality will be characterized by a threshold for productivity, which I call $Z_I$. Entrepreneurs with ability below $Z_I$ will be informal, while those with $Z \geq Z_I$ will be formal. If $Z_I > Z_E$, there are no formal firms that are fully complaint with the tax code: only informal and tax-evading formal firms co-exist. The mixture of firm types will depend on the policy parameters $\tau_0$, $\phi$, and $D$.

Lemma 2 If there is a productivity level $Z_P > 0$, such that $\omega(Z_P) > (1 - \tau_0)$, then there exists a unique value $Z_I \geq Z_P$, such that $\Pi_I(Z_I) = \max\{\Pi_C(Z_I), \Pi_E(Z_I)\}$. If $Z \leq Z_I$, the entrepreneur chooses to be informal.
Agents observe their productivity draw $Z$, and then choose to either become an entrepreneur or a worker, whichever gives them the highest earnings. Their problem is then

$$V(Z) = \max \{ \Pi^*(Z; w, r, \phi, \tau_0, D), w \},$$

where $\Pi^*(Z; w, r, \phi, \tau_0, D) = \max \{ \Pi_I(Z), \Pi_C(Z), \Pi_F(Z) \}$.

**Lemma 3** There exists a unique value $Z_W$ such that $V(Z_W) = \Pi^*(Z_W; w, r, \phi, \tau_0, D) = w$. If $Z < Z_W$, the agent chooses to become a worker.

### 2.2 Accumulation

The household derives utility from consumption streams only, and discounts the future at a rate $\beta \in (0, 1)$. It is endowed with an initial capital stock $K_0 > 0$, as well as a unit of time each period, which is supplied inelastically. The household consumes and accumulates capital so as to maximize lifetime utility,

$$\max_{C_t, K_{t+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t),$$

subject to

$$C_t + K_{t+1} \leq (1 - \delta + r_t)K_t + \int_{Z_H}^{Z_L} V(Z)dF(Z) + T_t,$$

where $\int_{Z_L}^{Z_H} V(Z)dF(Z)$ are the aggregate household earnings, and $T_t$ is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The function $u(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and strictly concave and satisfies Inada conditions. At the steady state, the Euler equation provides the standard result for the rental rate of capital

$$r = \frac{1}{\beta} - (1 - \delta).$$

### 2.3 Government

The government collects revenues $R_t$ from taxes and informality penalties. Since in equilibrium no informal firm is caught, all revenues come from tax collection. I assume the government runs a period-by-period balanced budget, so $R_t = T_t$, all $t$. Revenues from formal, compliant firms—when these exist—are given by

$$R^C = \int_{Z_L}^{Z_E} \tau_0 \Psi(w, r)ZdF(Z) = \tau_0 \Psi(w, r) [F(Z_E) - F(Z_L)].$$
The effective tax paid by formal, tax-evading firms is given by

$$\tau(Z) = \tau_0 \exp \left[ -\phi B(Z) \right] = \frac{1}{\phi \Psi(w, r)} Z.$$  

Notice that it does not depend on $$\tau_0$$. Then, when $$Z_E > Z_I$$ revenues from formal, tax-evading firms are

$$R^E = \int_{Z_E}^{Z_H} \tau(Z) \Psi(w, r) ZdF(Z) = \frac{1}{\phi} [F(Z_H) - F(Z_E)].$$

Total revenues are then $$R = R^C + R^E$$. When $$Z_E < Z_I$$, there are no formal firms that comply with the tax code, and so all revenues come from tax-evading firms,

$$R = R^E = \frac{1}{\phi} [F(Z_H) - F(Z_I)].$$

### 2.4 Equilibrium

A steady-state competitive equilibrium consists of constant input prices $$(w, r)$$, constant aggregate levels of consumption $$(C)$$ and capital $$(K)$$, an occupational choice cutoff $$Z_W$$, and firm-type choice cutoffs $$\{Z_I, Z_E\}$$ with their corresponding collections of input policies 

$$\{K^*(Z; w, r), N^*(Z; w, r), B(Z; w, r)\}$$

indexed by $$Z$$, such that:

i) the representative household problem is solved: $$r = 1/\beta - (1 - \delta),$$

ii) the firm-type choices and their respective input policies maximize profits, taking $$(w, r)$$ as given,

iii) the occupational choices maximize household earnings, taking $$(w, r)$$ as given,

iv) the labor, capital, and goods markets clear, and

$$\int_{Z_L}^{Z_W} df(Z) = \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} N^*(Z; w, r) df(Z), \quad (13)$$

$$K = \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} K^*(Z; w, r) df(Z), \quad (14)$$

$$C + \delta K = \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} Y^*(Z) df(Z) - \int_{\max(Z_E, Z_I)}^{Z_H} B(Z; w, r) df(Z), \quad (15)$$

v) the government budget is balanced.

$$R_t = \int_{Z_L}^{Z_E} \tau^*(Z) \Pi^*(Z) = T_t.$$
Figure 2: Equilibrium occupational and firm type choice—Case I: $Z_I < Z_E$.

Where $K^*(Z; w, r)$, $N^*(Z; w, r)$, $Y^*(Z; w, r)$, and $\tau^*(Z)$ correspond to the firm-type choice $\Pi^*(Z) = \max \{\Pi_I(Z), \Pi_C(Z), \Pi_F(Z)\}$.

The rental rate of capital is determined by the inter-temporal problem of the household. The thresholds—whose existence was determined in the previous section—and the wage rate are determined jointly through the labor market clearing condition. Notice that the left-hand side of (13) is the household’s labor supply, which is strictly increasing in $w$ (since $Z_W$ is increasing in $w$), while the right-hand side is the aggregate labor demand, which strictly decreasing in $w$ (since $Z_W$ is increasing in $w$ and $N^*(Z; w, r)$ is decreasing in $w$). Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, it is unique. In fact, since $N^*(Z; w, r) \rightarrow 0$ as $w \rightarrow \infty$, and $N^*(Z; w, r) \rightarrow \infty$ as $w \rightarrow 0$, and labor supply is zero when $w = 0$, existence is guaranteed.

In Figure 2, I show the equilibrium determination of occupational, and firm type choices for a case in which $Z_E > Z_I$. The figure plots the equilibrium profits for each type of firm, as well as the wage rate, as a function of rescaled productivities $Z^{1-\theta}$. The lower bound for productivities is set at one. Agents with productivities between one and $Z_W$ choose to become workers, whereas those with productivities greater than $Z_W$ but less than $Z_I$ choose to operate informal firms. Informal entrepreneurs with an ability between $Z_W$ and $Z_0$ are unconstrained by the detection threshold, and thus face a shadow cost of informality, $\mu(Z)$, of zero, while for those with abilities between $Z_0$ and $Z_E$, $\mu(Z) > 0$. Entrepreneurs with abilities between $Z_I$ and $Z_E$ choose to comply with the statutory tax rate, whereas those with abilities greater than $Z_E$ engage in costly tax evasion.

\[\text{2} \text{The rescaling is just for ease of display purposes.}\]
2.5 TFP losses from informality

Consider the centralized problem of allocating aggregate stocks of capital and labor across firms distributed over the interval \([Z_W, Z_H]\) according to some c.d.f. \(\tilde{F}(\cdot)\), so as to maximize total output

\[
\max_{\{K(Z), N(Z)\}} Y = \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} Z^{1-\theta}(K(Z)\alpha N(Z)^{1-\alpha})^{\theta} d\tilde{F}(Z),
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
K &= \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} K(Z) d\tilde{F}(Z), \\
N &= \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} N(Z) d\tilde{F}(Z).
\end{align*}
\]

Let \(\tilde{Z} = \int_{Z_W}^{Z_H} Z d\tilde{F}(Z)\). In an economy without informality, capital and labor are allocated so as to equalize returns to each factor across firms, which satisfies, for all \(Z\),

\[
\begin{align*}
K(Z) &= \frac{Z}{\tilde{Z}} K, \\
N(Z) &= \frac{Z}{\tilde{Z}} N.
\end{align*}
\]

Aggregate output is then equal to

\[
Y = TFP^F (K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha})^\theta,
\]

where

\[
TFP^F = \frac{Y}{(K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha})^\theta} = \tilde{Z}^{1-\theta}.
\]

Now consider an economy where there are some informal firms. The labor and capital allocations of informal firms in this case are

\[
\begin{align*}
K(Z) &= \omega_K(Z) \frac{Z}{\tilde{Z}} K, \\
N(Z) &= \omega_N(Z) \frac{Z}{\tilde{Z}} N.
\end{align*}
\]
The wedges $\omega_K(Z), \omega_N(Z) \in (0, 1]$ measure the firm-level inefficiency in the allocation of resources due to informality, and are given by

\[
\omega_K(Z) = \left( \frac{r}{r + \mu(Z)} \right)^{\frac{1-\theta(1-\alpha)}{1-\theta}}, \\
\omega_N(Z) = \left( \frac{r}{r + \mu(Z)} \right)^{\frac{\beta\alpha}{1-\theta}}.
\]

Aggregate productivity is then

\[
TFP^I = \frac{\int_{Z_W}^{Z_I} \omega_Y(Z)Zd\tilde{F} + \int_{Z_I}^{Z_H} Zd\tilde{F}}{Z^\theta},
\]

where $\omega_Y(Z) = [\omega_K(Z)^\alpha \omega_N(Z)^{1-\alpha}]^\theta$. Clearly, as long as there is a set $Z \subset [Z_W, Z_I]$, such that $\omega_Y(Z) \in (0, 1)$ for $Z \in Z$, $TFP^I < TFP^F$. In other words, if there are some informal firms constrained by the detection threshold $D$, there will be aggregate productivity losses due to informality.

Notice that $TFP^I = TFP^F$ both when $D = 0$ and when $D = \infty$. In the first case there is no advantage to informality, so all firms are formal, while in the second, the detection threshold does not create any distortions in the allocation of inputs, so all firms choose informality, without causing any productivity losses. This gives rise to a U-shaped relationship between informality and productivity. Leal-Ordóñez (2014) finds the same result in a numerical exercise. It is not surprising, then, that full enforcement against informality achieves productivity gains. The same can be said about the effects of $D$ on output and the capital stock. Clearly, when $D = 0$ tax revenues are as high as they can be, while when $D = \infty$, they are zero.

2.6 Enforcement at the intensive margin: reducing tax evasion by formal firms

I start with the case in which $Z_I < Z_E$, so that some formal firms choose not to evade taxes. An improvement on the enforcement of taxes on formal firms takes the form of a reduction in $\phi$. In this case, $Z_E = [\phi\tau_0 \Psi(w, r)]^{-1}$ increases, since the change in $\phi$ does not affect the aggregate demand for labor, and therefore has no effect on $w$. The result is higher government revenues, and less tax evasion by formal firms. No other aggregate variables are influenced by the improvement in enforcement.

When the economy is at an equilibrium in which $Z_I > Z_E$, only informal and formal tax-
evading firms operate. In this case, a decrease in $\phi$ will increase the informality cutoff $Z_I$, increasing the size of the informal sector. To the extent that there were some constrained informal firms operating before the change, the marginal firms coming into the informal sector as a result of the change in $\phi$ will be constrained, which will result in lower TFP and a lower aggregate capital stock.

The effect on government revenues is not as clear: on one hand, firms that were paying some taxes before the change will not pay any taxes, since they will move to the informal sector. On the other hand, the remaining tax-evading firms will face a stronger enforcement, which increases the revenue collected from them. The total impact on revenues depends on which effect dominates.

Ultimately, because changes in either margin of enforcement affect the equilibrium productivity thresholds for firm type and occupational choices, their aggregate effects depend on the distribution of productivities, $F(\cdot)$. Thus, to move forward in the discussion of the effects of enforcement, we need to impose a parametric structure and assign parameter values that closely match some aspects of a real economy.

### 3 Parameterization and calibration

I follow the vast literature on firm-size distributions starting with Axtell (2001), and assume that productivities are distributed according to a Pareto distribution. In particular, I assume that the rescaled managerial ability $Z^{1-\theta}$ satisfies

$$
Pr(Z^{1-\theta} \leq z) = \frac{1 - \left(\frac{z}{Z_L}\right)^{-S}}{1 - \left(\frac{z}{Z_H}\right)^{-S}},
$$

All parameters are chosen to match certain aspects of the Mexican economy. As explained by Leal-Ordóñez (2014), the lower bound $Z_L$, can be chosen arbitrarily, since it has to be that $Z_W > Z_L$ for the problem to make sense. That is, in equilibrium, all agents with $Z < Z_W$ become workers.

According to the 2009 Economic Census, firm sizes of Mexican establishments ranged from 1 to 12,226, with an average firm size of 5.5. I calibrate the upper bound $Z_H$, as well as the shape parameter $S$, so that the equilibrium distribution of firm sizes matches the average size, and

$$
\left(\frac{N_E(Z_H)}{N_I(Z_W)}\right)^{1-\theta} = \left(\frac{Z_H}{\omega_N(Z_W)Z_W}\right)^{1-\theta} = (12,226)^{1-\theta} = 9.5.
$$
I calibrate the threshold parameter $D$ to match the share of workers in the informal sector in Mexico, which is 34% according to the International Labor Organization (ILO). It is important to distinguish between “workers employed in the informal sector” and “informal workers.” The informal sector is a firm-based concept, encompassing all persons working in productive units that have informal characteristics, including legal status, registration, size, registration of employees and bookkeeping practices. Informal employment, in turn, is a job-based concept, which includes all workers in the formal sector, informal sector, or households, whose main jobs lack basic social or legal protections, or employment benefits (ILO, 2012). It follows that the workers in the informal sector represent a subset of informal employment. I focus on the former, because my model only makes predictions about those workers employed in the informal sector. Total informal workers represent 53% of the labor force, so around a third of them work outside the informal sector. In a recent paper, Ulyssea (2014) shows how both concepts of informality interact in an economy with heterogeneous establishments.

The type of tax I consider in the model most closely resembles a tax on business profits. I set $\tau_0 = 0.3$, which corresponds to the statutory income tax rate for businesses and corporations, and calibrate $\phi$ so as to match the revenues from business income taxes as a percentage of GDP. According to the Mexican tax authorities (SHCP by its Spanish acronym), business income taxes and other taxes on business profits accounted for 54% of all income tax collected in 2009 (SHCP, 2010). In turn, total income tax revenues for the same year accounted for 4.9% of GDP (OECD, 2015). This implies that the income tax collected from businesses represents 2.7% of GDP.

Tax evasion is, by its secretive nature, hard to measure. In the most recent study commissioned by the tax authorities in Mexico, Fuentes Castro, et.al. (2010) estimate the average income tax evasion by businesses at one percent of GDP, for the period 2001-2008. This figure amounts to 37 percent of current tax collection. On the other hand, the official budget for business income tax expense—non-accrued tax revenues due to differential tax rates, exemptions, subsidies and tax credits, fiscal stimulus, authorized deductions, and special tax regimes and treatments—represented 1.2 percent of GDP in 2009 (SHCP, 2009). Because these figures on tax evasion and government tax expense are imperfect estimates, I do not rely on them for the baseline calibration.\(^3\)

The discount rate $\beta$ is set to match the capital-output ratio. I use the calculations of Restuccia (2008) and Leal-Ordóñez (2014), who find values for the capital-output ratio of 1.9 and 2 for Mexico, using distinct data sources. The depreciation rate $\delta$ is taken from INEGI’s own calculation using the 2014 Economic Census (INEGI, 2015). The rest of the parameters are taken from related papers that use Mexican data: I take the capital share

\(^3\)However, they are useful as benchmarks to compare counterfactual results.
of income $\alpha$ from Bergoeing, et.al. (2002), and the diminishing returns parameter $\theta$ from Leal-Ordóñez (2014). All sources and target moments are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Parameter Values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>capital share</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Bergoeing, et.al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>depreciation rate</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>INEGI, 2014 Economic Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_0$</td>
<td>statutory tax rate</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Mexico’s business income tax rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>span of control</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>Leal-Ordonez (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_{L}^{1-\theta}$</td>
<td>Pareto lower bound</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arbitrary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D$</td>
<td>informality detection</td>
<td>6.4585</td>
<td>Size of informal sector (emp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>returns to tax evasion</td>
<td>1.0448</td>
<td>Revenues/GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_{H}^{1-\theta}$</td>
<td>Pareto upper bound</td>
<td>12.5866</td>
<td>Size range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s$</td>
<td>Pareto shape</td>
<td>6.8118</td>
<td>Average firm size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>discount rate</td>
<td>0.9576</td>
<td>Capital-output ratio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the calibration results. The model successfully matches all targeted moments, and does a decent job at matching some non-targeted moments. Most firms in Mexico are small and informal, which is also the case in the baseline calibration. However, the model predicts a share of medium sized firms that is larger than that observed in the data (8.07% vs. 4.65%).

I use financial statement data from COMPUSTAT Global, and estimate average effective tax rates (ETR) for an unbalanced panel of public firms in Mexico for the period 1990-2014. I compute ETR as the ratio of total income tax expense (TXT) to the difference between pre-tax income (PI) and special items (SPI). McGuire, et.al. (2012) use the same definition of ETR to study the effects of industry-specific experience of managers on tax avoidance. These ETRs are a good, if imperfect, candidate for the empirical counterpart of the effective tax rates in the model. For instance, Mills, et.al. (1998) suggest that expenditures on tax planning result in lower ETRs, whereas Cook, et.al. (2008) provide evidence that the

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4With the exception of the observation for the size of the largest establishment, which comes from restricted-access data from the 2009 Economic Census, all data on the size distribution of establishments come from publicly available reports by INEGI, using data from the 2014 Economic Census. The moments of the size distribution considered in the baseline calibration and in the tests of the model remained virtually unchanged from the 2009 to the 2014 Economic Census.
Table 2: Calibration Results: Moment Matching.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of informal sector (% of emp.)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues (% of GDP)</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \left( \frac{N_{\text{max}}}{N_{\text{min}}} \right)^{1-\theta} )</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average firm size</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-output ratio</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-targeted</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms of size ( &lt;= 10 )</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms of size between 11 and 50</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms of size between 51 and 250</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms of size ( &gt; 250 )</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

magnitude of the fees paid to external auditors is associated with greater reductions in ETRs.

ETRs in the sample exhibit large cross-sectional and time-series variability. The time-series variability stems in part from the ability that firms have to spread their tax bill over time, often deferring tax payments due in the current year to future years. I try to address this issue not considered by the theory by taking the time-series average for each firm’s ETR in the sample, dropping those firms with less than five years of data available. I then focus on two subsamples: one comprised of firms with an average ETR between 0 and 70%, as in McGuire, et.al. (2012), and a second with firms with an average ETR between 0 and 35%, which is the highest statutory income tax rate during the sample period. The resulting sample sizes are 134 and 114.  

The ETR data are far from representative of formal firms in Mexico, as only 0.1 percent of all firms are publicly listed. Table 3 compares the total median, mean and standard deviations of the calculated ETRs, with those predicted by the baseline calibration for all formal firms, and for formal, tax-evading firms. The mean and median estimates from both COMPUSTAT subsamples lie somewhere in between their model counterparts.

The model generates lower variability in ETRs than that observed even in the more restricted sample. This occurs because the model cannot generate either an ETR above the statutory tax rate, or the amount of firms with an ETR of zero that are present in the data,

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5As of October 2015, there are 140 firms listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange.
Table 3: Effective tax rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data—0-70% sample</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data—0-35% sample</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model—All formal firms</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model—Tax-evading firms</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: Author’s calculations using COMPUSTAT Global.

as it is clear from Figure 3. Even though I have partially adjusted for the ability of firms to shuffle their tax burden over time, the time horizon for any given firm is not long enough to completely account for this aspect of reality.

Figure 3: Distribution of effective tax rates

The inability of the model to produce a larger share of ETRs with a value of zero arises because the theory predicts a one-to-one, negative relationship between ETR and productivity, which may not be the case in the data. Further, the distribution of productivities was constructed to match the size distribution of establishments in Mexico, which has a thin right tail. Thus, in the baseline calibration, there are as many instances of zero ETRs as there are very large establishments.

Introducing another dimension of heterogeneity, for instance, in the returns to tax evasion,
Table 4: Equilibrium mixture of firms—baseline calibration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm type</th>
<th>Share of total firms</th>
<th>Share of total employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax compliant</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax evading</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

φ, can potentially remedy this deficiency. This exercise would be, in fact, a realistic extension that takes into account both the idiosyncratic ability to manage a firm’s tax burden and the existence of individual connections with tax authorities or able third-party expediters—none of which have to be positively correlated with productivity. Moreover, heterogeneity in both productivity and the returns to tax evasion has further implications for the equilibrium mixture of firms and for efficiency in the allocation of resources.

Table 4 shows the equilibrium mixture of establishments in the baseline calibration, where 71 percent of all firms are informal. This figure is smaller than the 87 percent reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2014) for manufacturing firms in Mexico, using the Economic Census from 2009. Tax compliant firms account for 19 percent of all firms and 22 percent of total employment, while tax evading firms represent 10 percent of all firms and 44 percent of employment.

The coexistence of small informal firms that pay no taxes with large formal tax-evading firms gives rise to an effective tax schedule that relies on medium-sized firms, as shown in Figure 4. In a model where tax authorities are optimizing agents that choose auditing schemes based on observable input choices by firms, Zilberman (2015) also finds this non-monotonicity of effective tax rates with respect to productivity. Figure 5 shows that medium-sized firms account for a disproportionately large share of total tax revenues. In the baseline calibration, firms of sizes 5 to 50 account for 94 percent of total revenues. This result ties the “missing middle” phenomenon—the scarcity of small and medium-sized firms relative to microenterprises and large firms—to a low capacity to generate tax revenues. Hsieh and Olken (2014) have recently shown that, in reality, both middle and large firms are missing from the distribution of firm sizes in developing countries. Mexico is, in fact, an example where both medium and large firms are scarce relative to micro firms: 75 percent of firms have four or less employees and, as shown in Table 2, the right tail is very thin. Still, the model links either interpretation of the “missing middle” to low income tax revenues.
4 Equilibrium counterfactuals

4.1 Partial enforcement

I start by considering the effects of partial improvements on enforcement along both margins. The second column of Table 5 shows the effects of a 50 percent reduction in the share of tax evading firms, relative to the baseline calibration. Since there are some formal firms that comply with the statutory tax rate in the baseline calibration, TFP, the capital stock, output, wages and the size of the informal sector remain unaffected. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP increase by 16 percent, while the share of compliant firms increases by 26 percent. The amount of rent-seeking (tax-evading expenditures) as a percentage of GDP declines 23 percent.

The third column of Table 5 quantifies the effects of a 50 percent reduction in the employment share of the informal sector. TFP, capital and output increase by 9, 14, and 13 percent, while the equilibrium wage decreases by 2 percent. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP increase 40 percent. The share of tax-compliant firms more than doubles, while the share of informal firms decreases by 36 percent. The decrease in the wage rate causes the share of tax-evading firms and rent-seeking as a percentage of GDP to increase by 23 and seven percent.
4.2 Full enforcement

Table 6 shows the effects of full enforcement along both margins. Again, because there are some formal compliant firms in the baseline equilibrium, TFP, capital, output, the wage rate, and the size of the informal sector all remain unaffected by the elimination of formal tax-evading firms. Tax revenues as a share of GDP increase by 68 percent: from 2.7 to 4.5 percent. This gain of 1.8 basis points is slightly smaller than the implied gain of 2.2 that we obtain from official estimates (1 from eliminating tax evasion plus 1.2 from eliminating the sources of tax expense). Last, the share of tax-compliant firms increases by 53 percent.

A complete reduction in informality generates the largest gains. TFP, capital, and output increase by 28, 51, and 44 percent. The equilibrium wage decreases by 4 percent. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP increase 80 percent. Since most firms are informal in the baseline calibration, eliminating the informal sector increases the share of tax-compliant firms by a factor of 4.5. As in the case of partial enforcement, the decrease in the wage rate generates a 61 percent increase in the share of tax-evading firms, and 15 percent increase in rent seeking.

The enforcement policies have very different effects on how tax revenues are distributed across firms. In Figure 6 I show the distribution of tax revenues across firm sizes for three cases: the baseline calibration (dark blue), full enforcement on informality (light blue), and
Table 5: Counterfactuals: The effects of partial enforcement—change relative to baseline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate</th>
<th>50% reduction in share of formal tax-evading firms</th>
<th>50% reduction in share of informal employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Stock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal employment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenues (% of GDP)</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax-compliant firms (%)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal firms (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal, tax-evading firms (%)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent-seeking (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Counterfactuals: The effects of full enforcement—change relative to baseline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate</th>
<th>100% reduction in share of formal tax-evading firms</th>
<th>100% reduction in share of informal employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Stock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informality employment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenues (% of GDP)</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax-compliant firms (%)</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal firms (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal, tax-evading firms (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent-seeking (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Full enforcement on formal tax evasion (red). Eliminating the informal sector redistributes some of the tax revenues from medium sized firms to small firms, while large firms continue to contribute only a small fraction. On the other hand, if all formal firms pay the statutory tax rate, there is an upward redistribution of tax collection, with larger firms accounting for 23 percent of revenues.
Figure 6: Share of total revenues by employment size: Baseline vs. counterfactuals.

4.3 A “real world” counterfactual

The federal government of Mexico recently called off a plan to reduce the statutory income tax rate for businesses and corporations, from 30 percent, back to its 2010-level of 28 percent. In Table 7, I show that the effects of going through with the original plan are positive, but very modest. In fact, as shown in Figure 7, recent income tax rates in Mexico have been near their revenue-maximizing values. Notice that this counterfactual Laffer curve takes into account the general equilibrium responses of both informality and tax evasion by formal firms, generated by changes in the statutory tax rate. This result suggests that further improvements in the state’s capacity to generate income tax revenues are unlikely to come from additional changes to these rates, but rather from better enforcement.

4.4 The effects of economic development

Another question we could ask is: will the composition of firms change, without any policy intervention, as the economy develops? The answer is, not surprisingly, yes. One could carry out such exercise, in a very reduced-form way, by considering outward shifts in the support of the distribution of productivities, $F(\cdot)$. Lucas (2009), and Perla and Tonetti
Table 7: Counterfactuals: $\tau_0 = 0.28$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate</th>
<th>Change relative to baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Stock</td>
<td>1.0134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>1.0072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector (% of employment)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenues (% of GDP)</td>
<td>1.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of tax-compliant firms</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of informal firms</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of formal, tax-evading firms</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent-seeking sector (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Counterfactual Laffer curve and recent income tax rates in Mexico.

(2014) provide models where outward shifts in the distribution of individual productivities occur endogenously through the flow of ideas.

As $[Z_L, Z_H]$ shifts out, informality becomes less attractive for a growing share of firms. In Table 8, I show the effects of a 44% displacement of the support of $F$, which is the
minimum increase that eliminates informality completely. The implied gains are very large, with output increasing more than two times the baseline value. These calculations suggest that if Mexico grew at a constant annual rate of 1.2 percent, which has been the average over the past 25 years, it would take the country 70 years to grow out of informality.

Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP increase, but less so than when we eliminate either formal tax evasion or informality via full enforcement. This happens because, without any changes in the enforcement parameters, the share of formal, tax-evading firms increase as the economy develops. In fact, it turns out that the minimum growth necessary to eliminate informality also coincides with the highest level of tax collection.

In Figure 8, I show the effects of economic development on revenues as a share of GDP, the employment share of the informal sector, the share of formal, tax-evading firms, and tax-evading expenditures as a share of GDP. The dotted vertical line indicates a growth factor of 1.44—the minimum growth required to eliminate informality. Beyond that point, tax revenues as a share of GDP steadily decline, the informal sector disappears, while both the share of formal, tax-evading firms and tax-evading expenditures as a share of GDP continue to increase. The latter partially explains the rise of professions such as accounting and law as economies develop.

Table 8: Growth counterfactual—a 44% increase in $[Z_L, Z_H]$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate</th>
<th>Change relative to baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Stock</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector (% of employment)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenues (% of GDP)</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of tax-compliant firms</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of informal firms</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of formal, tax-evading firms</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent-seeking sector (% of GDP)</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This growth counterfactual exercise provides a rationale for the existence of developed countries with high tax evasion and/or avoidance. For instance, in 2009, per capita GDP

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6Since population is constant, growth in output per capita is the same as growth in total output.

7The growth rate is calculated using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators series for PPP-adjusted GDP per capita at constant 2005 international dollars.
in Greece was 2.07 times that in Mexico. On the other hand, total income tax revenues as a percentage of GDP were 6.9 for Greece, and 5.2 for Mexico, both falling well below the OECD average of 11 percent.\footnote{As before, per capita GDP data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, while data on tax revenues come from the OECD’s Revenue Statistics. The OECD includes information on the contribution of corporations to income tax revenues. However, these are not comparable with my calculations for Mexico, which include non-incorporated businesses.}

5 Concluding remarks

I presented a model where informal, formal tax-compliant, and formal tax-evading firms coexist in equilibrium, as a result of the institutional environment. The theory predicts a system of effective tax rates that relies on medium-sized firms to raise revenues. This result links the evidence on the so-called “missing middle” in developing countries to a low capacity to generate income tax revenues.

When the distribution of productivities improves over time, given taxes and enforcement parameters, informality decreases, but formal tax evasion increases, thus limiting the state’s
capacity to raise tax revenues. If, as suggested by LaPorta and Shleifer (2014), lower informality is a byproduct of development, and not vice versa, then the tax authorities’ efforts to raise revenues could be more effective when directed towards formal tax evasion.

In an attempt to keep the theory clear and tractable—but still suitable for quantitative analysis—I have abstracted from some aspects of reality that would be interesting to consider in future work. Specifically, there is evidence that the enforcement of some taxes increases with firm size, as argued by Levy (2008). One could also think about how the rent seeking interacts with sources of misallocation other than informality, such as financial constraints, as in López (2014). Last, the limited evidence on firm-level effective income tax rates suggests that the returns to firm’s tax-evading efforts are not constant across firms. Allowing for heterogeneity in both productivity and the returns to tax-evasion expenditures would bring us a step closer to understanding the aggregate consequences of having an institutional environment that rewards rent-seeking skills, and of firm-level political and bureaucratic connections.

References


OECD, Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2015.


Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose an agent has decided to be a formal entrepreneur. He will chose to evade taxes as long as $\Pi_E(Z) > \Pi_C(Z)$, and is indifferent between evading taxes and complying whenever $\Pi_E(Z) = \Pi_C(Z)$. The indifference condition is given by

$$Z_E\Psi(w,r) - \frac{1}{\phi} [1 + \log(\tau_0\phi Z_E\Psi(w,r))] = (1 - \tau_0) Z_E\Psi(w,r),$$

which simplifies to

$$\tau_0\Psi(w,r)Z_E = \frac{1 + \log(\tau_0\phi\Psi(w,r)Z_E)}{\phi}. \tag{16}$$

Notice that the left hand side of (16) is the cost of being compliant, while the right hand side represents the cost of evading taxes. Let $X = \tau_0\phi\Psi(w,r)Z$. The expression above can then be rewritten as $X = 1 + \log(X)$, which has a unique fixed point at $X^* = 1$. Moreover, this fixed point is also a tangency point, with $X > 1 + \log(X)$ whenever $X > 1$. This condition pins down the productivity cutoff for tax evasion at $Z_E = [\tau_0\phi\Psi(w,r)]^{-1}$. For $Z > Z_E$, the cost of being compliant exceeds the cost of tax evasion. For $Z < Z_E$, $B(Z) < 0$, which violates the non-negativity constraint, while $B(Z_E) = 0$. Therefore, entrepreneurs with ability $Z \leq Z_E$ will choose $B(Z) = 0$, and pay the statutory tax rate, while those with ability $Z > Z_E$ will pay $B(Z) > 0$ in order to evade taxes. This concludes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 2. Assume there is a $Z_P > 0$ such that $\omega(Z_P) > (1 - \tau_0)$.

Case I: $Z_I < Z_E$. I start with the case in which there are some formal firms that chose to comply. In this case, the indifference condition is given by $\Pi_I(Z_I) = \Pi_C(Z_I)$, or

$$\omega(Z_I)Z_I\Psi(w,r) = (1 - \tau_0) Z_I\Psi(w,r),$$

which simplifies to

$$\omega(Z_I) = (1 - \tau_0)$$
The function \( \omega(Z) \in [0, 1] \) is decreasing, and strictly decreasing in \((0, 1)\).\(^9\) Since there is a \( Z_P > 0 \) such that \( \omega(Z_P) > (1 - \tau_0) \), by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique \( Z_I \) such that \( \omega(Z_I) = (1 - \tau_0) \).

*Case II: \( Z_I > Z_E \).* In this case only informal and tax-evading firms exist. First notice that we can write the profits of informal firms that are bound by the detection threshold as

\[
\Pi_I(Z) = (1 - (1 - \alpha)\theta) \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)\theta}{w} \right] \frac{(1 - \alpha)\theta}{1 - (1 - \alpha)\theta} D \frac{\alpha\theta}{1 - (1 - \alpha)\theta} Z^{1 - \theta} - rD
\]

Since there are no formal tax-complaint firms, it has to be that \( \Pi_I(Z_E) > \Pi_E(Z_E) \). As \( Z \) increases and the detection threshold binds, the profit function \( \Pi_I(Z) \) will be strictly increasing and strictly concave. Since \( \Pi_E(Z) \) is strictly increasing and strictly convex for \( Z > Z_E \), it crosses \( \Pi_I(Z) \) only once, at \( Z_I \). This concludes the proof.

*Proof of Lemma 3.* The profit function \( \Pi^*(Z; w, \phi, \tau_0, D) \) is strictly increasing in \( Z \) with \( \Pi^*(0; w, \phi, \tau_0, D) = 0 \), so for any \( w > 0 \) there is a unique \( Z_W > 0 \) such that \( \Pi^*(Z_W; w, \phi, \tau_0, D) = w \). Clearly, \( V(Z) = \Pi^*(Z; w, \phi, \tau_0, D) \) for any \( Z \geq Z_W \) and \( V(Z) = w \) otherwise.

\(^9\)As \( Z \) increases, the size constrain binds and \( \mu(Z) \) increases, so \( \omega(Z) \) decreases.