"A Quantitative Theory of Tax Evasion"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 53, September 2017, Pages 107-126
"Financial Frictions and Productivity: Evidence from Mexico"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 66, November 2017, Pages 294-301
"Size-dependent policies, misallocation of talent, and the return to skill."
with Jesica Torres-Coronado (draft coming soon)
We study the allocation of talent in knowledge-based hierarchies subject to size-dependent regulations, which we model as a tax on labor that increases with firm size. The size-dependent tax encourages employers to constrain the size of their firm, and discourages their wage workers to fully exploit their talent. The policy also reallocates the marginal individual in each occupation, which in turn changes the sorting of the infra-marginal individuals. As a result, employers coordinate less-talented
employees, and run smaller firms, compared to the equilibrium without distortions. We fully characterize and calibrate a parametric example to match some features of the U.S. firm-size distribution. We find that size-dependent policies reduce the earnings and the returns to skill of both the best managers and workers. By misallocating talent throughout the entire economy, size-dependent policies have much larger aggregate effects than those predicted by a standard model with heterogeneous managers and homogeneous workers.
"Entrepreneurship and Rent Seeking under Credit Constraints"
Job Market Paper (new version coming soon).
"The Role of Workplace Flexibility in Home Production and the Search for Market Labor"
with Jennifer St. Clair (draft coming soon).
A flexible work schedule is a valuable attribute of a job, but often comes at a cost to both workers and firms. We develop a simple model of the labor market that incorporates a role for temporal flexibility. Workers differ in their ability to substitute market goods for time at home, inducing heterogeneity in their willingness to forgo wages in exchange for greater flexibility. Firms vary in their productivity, as well as in the cost of providing a flexible work schedule. Our framework enables us to quantify the market value attached to flexible jobs, as well as the welfare gains from increasing their availability.
"Advertising and Pricing When Attention is Limited"
with Carmen Astorne-Figari and Aleksandr Yankelevich (revise and resubmit at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964298
We analyze markets where firms that compete on price advertise to vie for consumers’ limited attention. Our baseline model of attention has a number of desirable properties. Foremost, it offers an explanation for price dispersion in homogeneous goods markets in the absence of search costs (e.g., when search costs are sunk). Moreover, it leads to a unique symmetric price distribution that changes from marginal cost to monopoly pricing as attention becomes more limited. When firms can influence consumer attention by advertising and the cost of advertising is low, advertising leads firms to a prisoner’s dilemma that adversely impacts profits without changing prices. However, moderately costly advertising could lead firms to effectively fight for attention and raise prices and possibly profits.
Work in Progress
"Financial Frictions, Informality, and Aggregate Productivity."
"Tax Evasion, Informality, and Misallocation."
"An evaluation of real-time forecasting performance across 10 western U.S. States,"
with Keith R. Phillips, Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, vol. 34, No. 2-3, 2009.
Click here to access.